Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Elmore County Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 42175 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
11-4-2014
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v.
Elmore County Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
42175
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Elmore County Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 42175" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court
Records & Briefs. 5161.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5161
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 




ELMORE COUNTY and THE BOARD OF 
ELMORE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondents-Appellees. 
In re: T.A. and T.O. 
Supreme Court No. 42175-2014 
Elmore Co. Dist. Court No. CV-2013-720 
Consolidated with Case No. CV-2013-722 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the 
County of Elmore, Honorable Lynn G. Norton, District Judge, Presiding 
ROBERT A. BERRY, #7742 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
251 E. Front St., Ste. 300 
PO Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant Saint 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
Michael R. Chapman, #5972 
Chapman Law Office, PLLC 
PO Box 1600 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 816 
Attorney for Amicus Kootenai Health 
Kristina M. Schindele, #6090 
Jessica L. Kuehn, #9059 
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office 
190 South 4th East 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Attorneys for Respondents-Appellees Elmore 
County and the Board of Elmore County 
Commissioners 
Michael J. Kane, #2652 
Michael Kane & Associates, PLLC 
PO Box 2865 
Boise, ID 83701-2865 
Attorney/or Amicus !AC 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 
II. ARGUl'vfENT ...................................................................................................................... 2 
A. The Applications Contained the Requisite Signatures and Information for 
the Third Party Applications .................................................................................... 2 
1. Idaho Code § 31-3504(1) Does NOT Require Applications to Be Signed 
by Both a Patient AND Third Party Applicant. .......................................... 2 
2. Idaho Code § 31-3502(7) Does Not Support the County and IAC's 
Position \Vhen Read Together with Idaho Code§ 31-3504(1) ................... 3 
3. The County's Arguments as to Who Must Sign and Where Are Not 
Supported by both the Application and the Code ....................................... 4 
4. The Applications Contained "Personal Information" ................................. 6 
B. Saint Alphonsus May file Third Party Applications Even \Vhere the 
Patients Refuse to Sign an Application, because it is a Real Party in 
Interest ..................................................................................................................... 7 
C. Third Party Applications Do Not Violate a Patient's Rights under the 
Code ......................................................................................................................... 9 
D. The IAC' s Burden-Shifting Standard is Not the Law under the Code .................. 10 
E. The IAC and County Disregard the Legislative History and Purpose 
Behind the Code ..................................................................................................... 11 
III. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 13 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..................................................................................................... 14 
TABLE OF AL'THORITIES 
Cases 
Brown v. Caldwell School Dist., 127 Idaho 112, 117 898 P.2d 43, 48 (1995) ............................... 4 
1vfercy Afrd Center v. Ada County, 146 Idaho 226,230, 192 P.3d 1050, 1054 (2008) ................. 1 
Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Afed'l Ctr. v. Ada County et al., 146 Ida,_11.o 862, 863, 204 P.3d 502, 
503 (2009) ..... ··············································· .................. ······················· ·························· ...... 8, 11 
Sewardv. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, 138 Idaho 509,512, 65 P.3d 531,534 (2003) .................... 8 
St. Luke's jvfagic Valley 1vfed'l Ctr. Ltd v. Bd of County Com 'rs of Gooding County, 150 
Idaho 484,488, 248 P.3d 735, 739 (2011) ................................................................................. 7 
St. Luke's Reg'! 1vfed'l Ctr. v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of Ada County, 146 Idaho 756-59, 
203 P.3d 683, 686-89 (2009) ................................................................................................ 8, 11 
Univ. of Hospital v. Ada County Bd. of Comm 'rs, 143 Idaho 808, 810-1 153 P.3d 
1154, 1156-58 (2007) ··························································································· 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 
Wheeler v. Idaho Dep 't of Health & Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 207 P.3d 988, 991.. ....................... 2 
Statutes 
Idaho Code § 9-1406 ....................................................................................................................... 5 
Idaho Code§ 31-3501 ................................................................................................................... 12 
Idaho Code§ 31-3501 et seq .......................................................................................................... 7 
Idaho Code§ 31-3502(2), (19), (26) ............................................................................................... 4 
Idaho Code § 31-3502(26) ........................................................................................................ 8, 11 
Idaho Code§ 31-3502(7) .............................................................................................. 2, 3, 4, 6, 12 
Idaho Code § 31-3503( 4) .............................................................................................................. 11 
Idaho Code§ 31-3503(c) ................................................................................................................ 2 
Idaho Code§ 31-3504 ................................................................................................................. 3, 8 
11 
Idaho Code§ 31-3504(1) .............................................................................................. 2, 3, 4, 9, 10 
Idaho Code§ 31-3504(2) ............................................................................................................ 3, 9 
Idaho Code§ 31-3505A .................................................................................................................. 9 
Idaho Code§ 31-3505A(l) ............................................................................................................. 7 
Idaho Code§ 31-3505A(2) ............................................................................................................. 7 
Idaho Code § 3 l-3505E .................................................................................................................. 7 
Idaho Code§ 73-101 ....................................................................................................................... 7 
Idaho Code§§ 31-3502(7) &-3504(1) ........................................................................................... 5 
Title31,Chapter35,IdahoCode ............................................ l,2,3,4,5,6, 7,8,9, 10, 11, 12, 13 
Other Authorities 
House Bill 310 ................................................................................................................................ 8 
I. INTRODlTCTION 
The response briefs by both the County and the Idaho Association of Counties ("IAC") 
demonstrate somewhat surprising indifference to the purpose of the Medical Indigency Act 
("Title 31, Chapter 35, Idaho Code" or "the Code"), which is to provide for medical care and 
treatment to their residents and also to provide for payment of such services when the Counties 
do not construct their own facilities to provide their own medical care and treatment. A prima 
facie case is for proving medical indigency has long been settled, and consists of (1) residency in 
the obligated county; (2) indigency from a standpoint of lack of resources; and (3) medical 
necessity of the treatment. Afercy 1Hed. Center v. Ada County, 146 Idaho 226, 230, 192 P .3d 
1050, 1054 (2008). 
Despite this, the County and IAC have now argued that a new element must be met 
before any mandatory investigation begins. They argue that an application must be "complete" 
under a tortured reading of both Idaho's medical indigency laws and the combined application 
prepared by the Department of Health and Welfare ("IDHW") and used in the medical indigency 
process. If not "complete" they argue, then they have no obligation to investigate, issue 
subpoenas or go beyond the inquiry as to whether or not the application was even complete. The 
position overturns long-standing principles and law under the Code. The hospital has no 
subpoena power unlike the County. It cannot compel a patient's attendance and cannot compel a 
patient or applicant to sign an application. Nevertheless, even though Saint Alphonsus, as a third 
party applicant, may expressly file an application under Idaho's laws, per the IAC and County, it 
car..not be "complete" absent the patient's or applicant's signatures. Their position effectively 
reduces the medical indigency process outlined by statute and case law into a legal game of 
"gotcha" to provide the County with a quick avenue to deny applications rather than fulfill their 
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duties in investigating and evaluating medical indigency applications. The County's argument is 
contrary to the language of the Code, the form of the Application that has been adopted to satisfy 
the Code, as well as Idaho precedent allowing for applications to be submitted by hospitals 
where an applicant refuses to cooperate. Finally, it places too great a burden on hospitals to 
secure signatures from patients who refuse to sign or even cannot sign due to death or incapacity. 
The position of the counties should not be condoned and the matter should be remanded to the 
Board so that they may conduct their mandatory investigative duties under the Code. 
II. ARGUlVIENT 
In a nutshell, the County's argument is that the third party applications vvere incomplete 
because they lacked the patients' signatures. 1 (See Appellee's Brief§ IV.B. l, pp. 25-30.) The 
argument runs counter to Idaho Code § 31-3504(1 ), the language of Idaho Code § 31-3502(7), 
and the form of the Application itself that is mandated by Idaho Code § 31-3503(c). It 
effectively renders the term "third party applicant" meaningless. Finally, it runs completely 
contrary to Idaho Supreme Court precedent allowing for third party applications where patients 
refuse to cooperate or sign applications. 
A. The Applications Contained the Requisite Signatures and Information for 
the Third Partv Applications. 
1. Idaho Code § 31-3504(1) Does NOT Require Applications to Be 
Signed by Both a Patient AND Third Party Applicant. 
The disconnect in the County's argument as to who must sign an application is found at 
pages 27-28 of the Appellee's Brief where the County states "that a third party applicant is 
1 As an initial matter, the County recites a burden regarding completed applications that is 
not found in the Code and is not discussed in Wheeler v. Idaho Dep 't of Health & Welfare, 147 
Idaho 257, 207 P.3d 988, 991. 
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required to present an application in the same form and manner as an applicant. LC. § 31-3504. 
This would include all necessary signatures." The Code actually reads as follows: 
(2) If a third party completed application is filed, the application shall be 
presented in the same form and manner as set forth in subsection (1) of this 
section. 
Idaho Code§ 31-3504(2)(emphasis added). Idaho Code§ 31-3504(1) identifies the necessary 
signatures. It demonstrates that the signatures of both an "applicant" and "third party applicant" 
are not required, which is made amply clear in the following provision through the use of "QI": 
The completed application shall be signed by the applicant or third party 
applicant, an authorized representative of the applicant, QI, if the applicant is 
incompetent or incapacitated, someone acting responsibly for the applicant and 
filed in the clerk's office." 
Idaho Code§ 31-3504(l)(emphases added). Accordingly, the signatures of a patient or applicant 
are not necessary signatures in a third party application; otherwise, the Code vvould have read 
that the "completed application shall be signed by the applicant. .. 
and the District Court to hold otherwise. 
It was error for the Board 
2. Idaho Code § 31-3502(7) Does Not Support the County and IAC's 
Position When Read Together with Idaho Code§ 31-3504(1). 
As noted in Appellant's Brief, Idaho Code § 31-3502(7) provides none of the specificity 
that the District Court and the County or IAC insist is required. Idaho Code § 31-3502(7) does 
not say that the cover sheet or the first page of an Application has to be signed. It does not say 
that the patient rights and responsibilities or releases need to be signed. While it contains the 
oblique statement that the applications contain "all other signatures required in the application," 
it does not specify who needs to sign and where. (Id.) Given that § 31-3502(7) does not specify 
who needs to sign and where, and that Idaho Code§ 31-3504(1) expressly allows an application 
to be filed by a third party applicant or applicant, Idaho Code § 31-3502(7) cannot be read to 
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require both of their signatures. The language simply is not present in § 31-3502(7) or § 31-
3504(1 ). Accordingly, as Saint Alphonsus noted in its Opening Brief, the specific 
determinations of who needs to sign and where were legislatively assigned to IDHW to make, 
and, in tum, IDHW determined what signatures would be required in the Application and where 
they would be necessary. 
3. The County's Arguments as to Who Must Sign and \,Vhere Are Not 
Supported by both the Application and the Code. 
The arguments in relation to the Application form itself by both the County and IAC 
render the term "third party applicant" meaningless. ·while they argue that the patient and 
applicant must have signed a third party application, neither § 31-3502(7) nor § 31-3504(1) 
support this argument. It is simply their is contrary to the language of the Code. 
Effectively, however, also appear to be arguing that Saint Alphonsus, as a third party 
applicant, should have nonsensically signed the Applications in the designated spaces actually 
meant for the patient, applicant, or co-applicant even though these terms have distinct and 
defined meanings under the Code. Idaho Code§ 31-3502(2), (19), (26). Under the County's 
interpretation, this is to presume that the legislature performed an idle act by enacting a 
meaningless provision, which is a method of statutory construction that is not condoned. See, 
e.g., Brown v. Caldwell School Dist., 127 Idaho 112, 117 898 P.2d 43, 48 (1995)("A statute 
should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be rendered 
superfluous or insignificant. Further, we do not presume that the legislature performed an idle 
act by enacting a meaningless provision.") Moreover, given that the very amendment in 2011 
that created the definition of "completed application" uses the term "third party applicant" or 
"third party application" twenty-three times; their arguments belie what the legislature intended. 
(See Exhibit A to the Amicus Brief filed by the IAC.) 
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Accordingly, a third party application is different than a first-party application and the 
signatures required for one are different than the other. In other words, a third party application 
does not require all of the signatures of the patient, applicant, or co-applicant.2 As such, Saint 
Alphonsus appropriately did not sign page 1 of the Application, which only calls for the 
signature of the "applicant" or "co-applicant" and not the "third party applicant." It 
appropriately did not initial the "Patient Rights and Responsibility for State and County 
Assistance" since those rights and responsibilities relate to the patient and not those of the "third 
party applicant." However, it appropriately signed the designated area for third party applicant 
that was designed by IDHW. Finally, it appropriately did not sign the page 10 or the release, 
because, again, 
and not for the 
space requiring a signature is for the patient, applicant, or co-applicant 
party applicant. In summary, Saint Alphonsus signed at every space 
designated by IDH\V to sign as a third party applicant. It therefore appropriately followed the 
form of the Application itself as well as Idaho Code §§ 31-3502(7) & -3504(1), because the 
signatures of the patient, applicant, and/or co-applicant were not necessary signatures. 
As to the svvorn statement issue on page 9 of the Applications, Saint Alphonsus submits 
that the last part of form is insufficient to constitute a sworn statement. The at-issue portion 
is found within the section pertaining only to "For County Assistance" under the "Patient Rights 
and Responsibilities for State and County Assistance." The entire area is phrased as "rights" or 
"responsibilities" of the Patient or Applicant; they are not phrased as "svvorn statements" or 
"sworn declarations" or, to use Idaho Code§ 9-1406 as an example since it was enacted at a later 
date, even close to the language found in it. The at-issue section itself contains no language as to 
2 Indeed, under the County's reasoning, if a patient submitted a first-party application that 
was not signed by the third party applicant, then it would be an incomplete application, which 
simply makes no sense, especially in the context of the entire purpose of the Code. 
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any averment as to the truth of the contents therein. Nevertheless, the at-issue section is not 
phrased to relate to a third party applicant that is a hospital such as Saint Alphonsus. First, again, 
the box is contained within the "Patient's Rights and Responsibilities" Section and even then it is 
a right or responsibility that applies only in the section "For County Assistance." There is no 
similar provision in the section "For State Assistance." Second, and most importantly, the 
language is phrased to apply to the patient or applicant and not a third party applicant, because 
the very first identified entity is a hospital: "If I give false or misleading information to a hospital 
... " In other words, this right or responsibility does not apply to a third party applicant such as 
Saint Alphonsus, because under the County's logic, it would read as follows: "If Saint Alphonsus 
gives false or misleading information to Saint Alphonsus." As noted in Appellant's Brief, there 
simply is no place in the form of IDH\V's applications that specify where the Applications 
should be sworn to the truth of the matter asserted. 
4. The Applications Contained "Personal Information". 
As above, the County attempts to address the lack of meaning to the terms within Idaho 
Code § 31-3502(7) by stating that the other code provisions, when read in conjunction, flesh out 
their meaning. (Appellee's Brief, p. 31.) The difficulty for the County, however, is that none of 
the other Code provisions contain the specific categories of information found in the Application. 
None of the Code provisions require the provision of a telephone number or email address and 
there is nothing in the Code speaking to their import. 3 Additionally, the County continues to 
adhere to its belief that the Applications were incomplete because they contained answers such 
as "No" "un..1<.nown" and "n/a." (T.O. R. at 172; T.A. R. at 118.) Clearly, information was 
3 The County argues that this information would have assisted the Clerk in performing 
her statutory duties, this runs squarely counter to its position, as well as that of the IAC, that 
the County does not have to do anything if the application is incomplete. 
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provided, but the statute fails to specify what exactly is necessary to meet the requirement of 
"personal information." Again, these findings, which presumably go to the "personal 
information of the applicant"4 phrase within the code section, are not defined by the Code. 
Moreover, third party applicants do not have to have complete knowledge of all matters 
necessary to establish eligibility (Idaho Code § 31-3505A(2)) and any information that 
presumably is missing or unverified, becomes part of the County's mandatory duty to 
investigate. Idaho Code § 31-3505A(l )("The clerk shall promptly notify the applicant, or third 
party filing an application on behalf of an applicant which, if omitted, may cause the application 
to be denied for incompleteness"). The position of the County also ignores the Code's 
provisions that allow the patient and providers to produce additional information, documents, 
records, and testimony all the way through an appeal hearing of an initial determination of 
denial. See, e.g., Idaho Code § 3 l-3505E. Accordingly, the arguments raised by the County 
regarding "incompleteness" of the Applications are unavailing and the District Court's 
determination on this specific issue should be upheld. 
B. Saint Alphonsus Mav file Third Partv Applications Even \Vhere the Patients 
Refuse to Sign an Application, because it is a Real Partv in Interest. 
The IAC mischaracterizes a hospital's rights under the Code when it notes that there was 
a '"long standing policy' of the courts to allow hospitals to stand in the shoes of patients when 
applying for payment." (IAC Amicus Brief, p. 6.) There was no such policy. Instead, there is 
and was a right of the hospital to seek reimbursement under the Code, because counties, for 
Even though this provision was amended, the amendment has no bearing on the appeal 
since Idaho laws are not applied retroactively and there is no expression to the otherwise 
regarding the aiuendments to the Code. See Idaho Code § 73-101; see generally Idaho Code § 
31-3501 et seq. Court is to consider the Code as it existed at the time an application for 
county assistance is filed. St. Luke's kfagic Valley Afed'l Ctr. Ltd. v. Bd. County Com of 
Gooding 1 Idaho 484,488,248 P.3d 735, 739 (2011). 
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most part, do not construct, maintain, staff and operate hospitals or otherwise provide medical 
care and treatment on their own, which is their obligation under Idaho law. Saint Alphonsus is in 
fact a real party in interest under the Code and it does not stand in the shoes of the patient. St. 
Luke's Reg'! A1ed'l Ctr. v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of Ada County, 146 Idaho 753, 756-59, 203 P.3d 683, 
686-89 (2009); Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Jvfed'l Ctr. v. Ada County et al., 146 Idaho 862, 863, 204 
P.3d 502, 503 (2009). Accordingly, as noted in Appellant's Brief, any claim made by a provider 
is not derivative of a patient; rather, providers such as Saint Alphonsus may file as third party 
applicants independently, especially where the patients fail to cooperate, as is the case here. 
Idaho Code § 31-3502(26); St. Luke's Reg 'l A1ed 'l Ctr. v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of Ada County, 146 
Idaho 753, 203 P.3d 683 (2009); Saint Alphonsus Reg'l ivied'! Ctr. v. Ada County et al., 146 
Idaho 862, 863, 204 P.3d 502, 503 (2009); Univ. of Utah Hospital v. Ada County Bd. of 
Comm 'rs, 143 Idaho 808, 810-12, 153 P.3d 1154, 1156-58 (2007). The recitation of law and 
authority to Seward v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, 138 Idaho 509, 512, 65 P.3d 531, 534 (2003) 
does not change this fact, because, again, "[t]he legislature is presumed not to intend to overturn 
long established principles of law unless an intention to do so plainly appears by express 
declaration or the language employed admits of no other construction." St. Luke's Reg 'l 1vfed 'l 
Ctr. v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of Ada County, 146 Idaho 753, 758, 203 P.3d 683, 688 (2009). There is 
nothing in House Bill 310 or the Session laws that evidences any express declarations that Saint 
Alphonsus may not file and pursue county assistance when patients, such as here, refuse to sign 
an application for county assistance. Clearly, the Legislature was not attempting to eliminate 
third party applications as the purpose statement even says: "AMENDING SECTION 31-3504, 
IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE FOR COMPLETED APPLICATION FOR FINANCIAL 
ASSISTANCE TO PROVIDE FOR A THIRD PARTY APPLICANT .... " (See Exhibit A to 
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the Amicus Brief of the IAC, p. 13.) Again, the Legislature saw fit to include the term third 
party applicant or third party application twenty-three times in the 2011 legislative changes. 
Accordingly, the many references to and use of the term "third party" do not support the IAC or 
the County's contention that providers may not file and pursue county assistance when patients 
refuse to sign an application for county assistance. 
C. Third Partv Applications Do Not Violate a Patient's Rights under the Code. 
The County argues that the patient's signatures are required so that the providers, 
counties and the CAT board may share confidential information regarding the applicant's health 
and finances, and that without the patient's signature it has no jurisdiction to consider a non-
completed application as that would violate the and letter of the Act as well as patient's 
rights. (See Appellee's Brief, pp. 27-28.) However, this position is contrary to the literal 
language of Idaho Code§ 31-3504(1) & -3504(2), also has been squarely by the 
Idaho Supreme Court, specifically in Univ. of Utah Hospital v. Ada County Bd of Comm 'rs, 143 
Idaho 808, 810-12, 153 P.3d 1154, 1156-58 (2007). It is contrary to the mandatory duty to 
investigate by a County and belies the subpoena power that the Legislature has provided to 
counties in order to fulfill its duties. Id. at 811, 153 P.3d at 1157; Idaho Code§ 3 l-3505A. As 
noted by the Idaho Supreme Court, the "[t]he investigative duty is mandatory and cannot be 
eliminated simply because the patient cannot or will not cooperate." Id at 811, 153 P.3d at 
1157. The County's position is also at odds with the legislative intent of the Code, something 
which the County did not discuss below at the District Court level. Finally, it is also difficult to 
understand how the patients' rights would be violated reimbursement was awarded under the 
Code. The patients here needed medical services and received the medical services, but 
nevertheless, could not pay for them. Even though the Code specifically envisions very 
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scenario, nevertheless, the County is now saying that it violates the patients' rights for Saint 
Alphonsus to attempt to get the Applications approved. 5 Again, this argument and position has 
been squarely rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. Univ. of Utah Hospital v. Ada County Bd. 
ofComm'rs, 143 Idaho 808, 810-12, 153 P.3d 1154, 1156-58 (2007). 
D. The IAC's Burden-Shifting Standard is Not the Law under the Code. 
The IAC contends that an application cannot be filed by anyone other than an applicant 
unless there is "authorization" or "a demonstration that the applicant is incompetent or 
incapacitated." (IAC Amicus Brief, p. 3 .) This statement is closely related to the County's 
contention in briefing before the District Court that Saint Alphonsus could have easily obtained 
the applicants' signatures. (See Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits, Respondent Elmore County and 
the Elmore County Board of Commissioners' Opening Brief filed November 8, 2013, p. 16). 
The burden that the IAC requires simply does not exist under the Code and the County's 
argument is speculation and contrary to the record before this Court. As made clear above, there 
is nothing in the language ofldaho Code § 31-3 5 04( 1) requires a third party applicant to first 
obtain authorization to file an application or demonstrate that a patient is incompetent or 
incapacitated. It is a burden that does not exist, but one that the IAC and County appear to want. 
The Code does not allow Saint Alphonsus to force a patient to sign an application, which is the 
reason the Code allows for third party applications, and there is no authority that allows a 
hospital to unilaterally obtain a general release or limited power of attorney without the patient's 
consent. The Code also does not allow a county to force a patient to sign an application. In this 
matter, both patients refused to sign the applications in front of the hospital and the County. The 
5 One suspects that if the County were to actually build, maintain and staff their own 
hospital, and provide necessary medical services to a resident, that once a resident refused to sign 
an application for county assistance, the refusal to do so would not preclude the County from 
attempting to seek reimbursement for the services that were provided. 
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County admitted as such in its additional statements of facts where it noted that T.O. failed to 
respond to a letter requesting an interview; failed to respond to a subpoena commanding T.O.'s 
presence; and when T.O. appeared for the interview, he refused to cooperate and sign the 
application. (See Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits, Respondent Elmore County and the Elmore 
County Board of Commissioners' Opening Brief filed November 8, 2013, p. 7.) Similarly with 
T.A., the patient failed to show to the scheduled interview and failed to return a follow-up 
interview. (See Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits, Respondent Elmore County and the Elmore 
County Board of Commissioners' Opening Brief filed November 8, 2013, pp. 7-8.) In no 
mariner could Saint Alphonsus have "easily obtained" either patient's signatures. Accordingly, 
Saint Alphonsus filed a complete application as a third party applicant as allowed by the Code 
and existing law. Idaho Code§ 31-3502(26); St. Luke's Reg'l ]vfed'l Ctr. v. Bd. Comm'rs of 
Ada County, 146 753, 203 P.3d 683 (2009); Saint Alphonsus Reg'l J\lfed'l Ctr. v. Ada 
County et al., 146 Idaho 862, 863, 204 P.3d 502, 503 (2009); Univ. of Utah Hospital v. Ada 
County Ed. ofComm'rs, 143 Idaho 808, 810-12, 153 P.3d 1154, 1156-58 (2007). 
E. The IAC and Countv Disregard the Legislative History and Purpose Behind 
the Code. 
The County did not contest the legislative intent and purpose behind the Code as set forth 
by Saint Alphonsus when it was before the District Court. All of its legislative intent and history 
arguments are now therefore raised for the first time on appeal, which is improper. Regardless of 
its impropriety, the County, when it had the chance before the District Court, did not contest the 
general intent behind the Code and the fact that counties ,vere given the jurisdiction and power 
"to provide county hospitals and public general hospitals for the county and others vvho are sick, 
injured, maimed, aged ... and to erect, enlarge, purchase, lease, or otherwise acquire, and to 
officer, maintain and improve hospitals, hospital grounds .... " Idaho Code § 31-3503( 4). 
1 1 , l 
Elmore County did not contest that it has chosen not to erect or purchase its own hospital to care 
for its medically indigent residents. While it does so now on appeal, it did not contest that the 
Idaho Supreme Court has stated that a provider's right to payment for medical services rendered 
is independent of the applicant: "In keeping with the second prong of this policy, we have held 
that a patient's refusal to cooperate under the medical indigency statutes does not terminate a 
provider's right to seek payment." University of Utah Hospital v. Ada County Board of 
Commissioners, 143 Idaho 808, 811, 153 P.3d 1154, 1156 (2007) (citation omitted) (emphasis 
added). It also did not contest then that the Board's construing of Idaho Code § 31-3502(7) in a 
narrow and confined fashion was and is at odds with the general intent of the Legislature, which 
is clearly expressed Idaho Code§ 31-3501. It did not contest below that the determination 
undercuts the very core of the Medical Indigency Act and is contrary to the general intent of the 
Legislature clearly expressed therein. It also did not contest then that the Legislature was 
sensitive to a provider's right to seek payment for medical services provided to indigent persons, 
and thus afforded a provider the right to seek and receive payment. 
The County and IAC's position has been crystalized now on appeal. Their arguments are 
squarely at odds with the general intent of the legislature. Instead, they seek to end-around 
clearly established legislative intent by attempting to create artificial technical barriers such that 
providers like Saint Alphonsus, who provide medical care and treatment to their residents, will 
not have a right to seek and receive payment under the Code if their own residents refuse to 
cooperate and sign an application. Under the County and IAC's idealization and construction of 
Idaho's medical indigency laws, whenever Saint Alphonsus provides a medically indigent 
Elmore County resident medical services, the patient could refuse to cooperate and Saint 
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Alphonsus would be precluded from seeking any relief under the Medical Indigency Act. Their 
arguments and approach undercut the very purpose of the Code and are meritless. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Board's decision 
denying the medical indigency applications be REVERSED and the matters REMANDED for 
further investigation by the County in accordance with its statutory duties under Title 31, 
Chapter 35, Idaho Code. 
DATED this '-/ day ofNovember, 2014. 
13 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By _ _,.f->,~-'--1-_.:_-=-1--------
R 
A eys for Petitioner-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this j day of November, 2014, I caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF to be served by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Kristina M. Schindele 
Jessica L. Kuehn 
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office 
190 South 4th East 
Mountain Horne, ID 83647 
Fax: 587-2147 
Attorney for Respondents 
Michael J. Kane 
Michael Kane & Associates, PLLC 
PO Box 2865 
Boise, ID 83701-2865 
Fax: 342-2323 
Attorney for IA C 
Michael R. Chapman 
Chapman Law Office, PLLC 
PO Box 1600 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Fax: (208) 667-7625 
Attorney for Kootenai Health 
14 
0~) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
('/) Email 
C\) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) F acsirnile 
()i) 
(X) .S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Email 
lt I\' Berry I 
